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I. Introduction 
We start this paper, in the following section 11-A. by recording the 
particular nature of business cycles in the decades immediately 
following World War 11. 1945-71. During these years demand was kept 
high, and one means of limiting the inflat.ionary consequences of that 
was by keeping the banking system under tight credit controls. So 
there were virtually no banking crises, and. consequently, bank 
regulation was light. 
When liberalisation nonetheless occurred. partly under the influ- 
ence of globalisation, the removal of exchange controls, information 
technology, elc.. a general inflationary asset price boom-bust occurred 
in the early 1970s. After that, and particularly after Volcker's 
monetary policy shift in October 1979. the monetary authorities 
gradually learnt how to use a market-oriented monetary policy to 
maintain price stability. This stabilisation of general consumer prices 
was, however, accompanied by a reversion of the business cycle in 
some respects to the kind of pattern seen, for example, in the decades 
up till 1913 when again consumer prices rcrnained stable. In this new 
pattern real shocks oftcn tended to generate fluct.uations in asset 
prices, which frequently led to asset price booms (bubbles) and busts, 
in which latter case banks would oftcn beconie fragile and fail. 
In this context therc was a rlecd to slrcngthen financial regulation, 
not only nationally hnl also internationally, give11 the extent of global 
competition il l  financial irite~.mediation. This is described in section 
11-B, where wc particularly focus on thc key role of the Basel 
Comniittee on Ranking Supervision in enabling a co-ordinated 
international responsc to a global problcm. 
Nevertheless the Basel approach had several weaknesses. The first 
is that regulation is inherently pro-cyclical. Banks are weaker in 
recessions and when asset prices decline. The more that regulation is 
based on current assessed riskincss and current market valuations, 
the more procyclical the regulatory system will becomc. The second is 
that supervision is, almost nccessarily, focussed on thc individual 
financial institution. But actions arid proccdurcs that, may appear 
obvious and straightfolward at thc individual level may be damaging, 
especially if rcgulat.ion reinforces herd activity, at thc aggregate 
systemic level. So in our next section, section 11-C, we consider not 
only the likely cxtent of procyclicality, l ~ u l  also stcps that might be 
taken to mitigate it. 
BANK REGULATION AND MACROECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS 5 
Section I1 approaches this subject at a fairly high level of generality. 
So we have chosen to support this overview with three more focussed 
empirical exercises. The first of these, section 111-A. shows how the 
relationship between liberalisation and a subsequent asset price 
boom-bust has been a common phenomenon, common to Western a s  
well as Asian countries, in developed as well as developing countries. 
In our main analysis, in section 11, we suggest that an increase in 
required bank capital during downturns may exacerbate the 
recession. We seek to support that hypothesis, in section 111-B, by 
looking (again) a t  the experience in the U.S.A. of the 'credit crunch' in 
the recession of 1990/91. when required bank capital adequacy ratios 
were being hoisted in the aftermath of the first Basel Accord in 1988. 
Finally, in section 111-C, we try to do a counter-factual simulation to 
see how banking capital adequacy requirements would have changed 
over recent history for a 'typical' bank in three countries. Mexico, 
Norway, and the United States, using three different regulatory 
approaches. These were: 
(i) The Basel II standardised approach 
(ii) The Basel II Foundation internal ratings based (IRB) approach 
(iii) An improved credit risk method (ICRM) 
What we show is that the introduction of the Basel I1 IRE3 approach 
may well considerably accentuate the procyclicality of the regulatory 
system. 
11. General Theoretical Analysis 
A. The Changing Nature of Cycles and the Role of Asset Prices 
The characteristics of trade cycles, of crises. and of financial 
regulation have all been changing over time. Eichengreen and Bordo 
(2003) and Bordo et al. (2001) divide up the hundred and twenty 
years since 1880 into four main periods, 1880-1913, 1919-1939, 
1945-1971 and 1973-1997. It is the third period that stands out as 
unique in several respects. First, inflation not only continued, but 
accelerated; this had never happened before then during peace-time. 
Second, in the developed world output and productivity growth was 
much higher than previously, or (with a few exceptions) subsequently, 
and unemployment low and stable. Third, there were no banking 
CRISIS F1<1?~111~N(:Y - _ . - - -  - --- - -~ 
I3anking (:1rrrchnc.y 'TWI r I All Year Crises Criscbs - - Crises Crlses - --
crises, ( s r r  E i c l i r ~ i ~ r r r n  ;111tl I3ordo. 'l';ll)lr 3.5, rrprodl~cctl  licre as 
Tablr 1: t h r  s;lriic. tl;lt;l arc. s l low~i  tli;rgr:un~~l;~tici~lly in I'igurr 1 ,  taken 
from Bol-(lo c.1 (11.. I'igul-c 1. 1,. 561. ;111tl. [lo doul)t Inrgcly in 
conscqrirncr. 1)nnk suprrvisio~i ;111tl rcgulatio~i r r ~ ~ i a i n c t l  generally 
light.' In I I I O S ~  c o u ~ ~ t r i c s .  at lc~lsl ur~ti l  1 1 1 ~ -  rntl of this  period 
(1945- 197 I ) ,  hnrik Irntlirlg to t llc. ~ ~ r i v ; ~ l r  src:tor was not orily tlirectly 
' For ;In ;lc.co\rnt ol thc chnnji~ng .;trrlc.l\~rc' ol I) ; I I I I< r~g~i l i~ t lon in the 
U.K.. s r r  Gootll~i~rt (2004). 
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constrained by credit controls in aggregate, but also directed towards 
the preferred sectors of exporting and manufacturing companies. 
Demand was generally kept high enough, primarily through 
expansionary fiscal policies. to keep unemployment below its 'natural' 
rate, so that inflation tended to accelerate from peak to peak. The 
monetary authorities would then raise interest rates to check 
inflation, and also the Balance of Paymentslcurrency crises that  
attended the comparatively more inflationary countries. It was said 
that every boom in the U.S.A. during these decades was killed off by 
the Federal Reserve System. Thereafter, during the Stop intervals, of 
the Go/Stop cycles of the time, interest rates would be lowered out of 
a wish to hold down the cost of public sector indebtedness and to 
encourage private sector investment. The increases in interest rates, 
sharp though they sometimes were, caused relatively little financial 
fragility since the banks assets were primarily short-dated government 
securities and loans to large (and generally safe) private sector 
(manufacturing) companies. 
The economically disastrous decade of the 1970s. with stagflation, 
brought about a reconstruction of the policy mix. In particular there 
was a maintained shift away from direct. central (government) 
controls towards market mechanisms. There was a similar shift from 
using fiscal policy, primarily to target a desired level of unemploy- 
ment, to using monetary policy, primarily to target a (low and stable) 
level of inflation. 
The banking system, owing to its central role in the economy, had 
been a focus for such prior controls, controls on interest rates, on 
credit allocation, on international financial flows (via exchange 
controls). So controlled were such commercial banks that they were 
seen a s  akin to public utilities, not commercial entities, boring, 
uninnovative, but safe. The main task of bank managers/loan officers 
was to say 'no' to requests for loans from prospective borrowers in 
less favoured sectors. Risk analysis and risk management atrophied 
in such circumstances. 
It has, therefore. not been surprising that one facet of the 
liberalisation of banking systems around the world has been a 
subsequent lending boom and subsequent bust. As we document in 
section 111-A this has occurred in country after country, starting 
perhaps in the U.K. where the liberalisation of 'Competition and Credit 
Control', Bank of England, 1971 was shortly followed by the Fringe 
Bank Crisis in 1973174 (see Reid (1982)). One common aggravating 
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feature was t.hat part of the business of the controlled commercial 
banks had, prior to the liberalisation. often been taken by new 
intermediaries whose raison d'etre was essentially to avoid such 
controls (with. or without, the blessing of the authorities). Once 
Hberalised there was a grab for market share by the commercial 
banks to recover previously lost business and by the non-bank 
intermediaries to hold on to it. Stir in the lack of experience with risk 
management, and the shift of the largest and safest borrowers to the 
capital markets. and the result was a danger of a boom-bust cycle. As 
noted in section 111-A, this became the experience in Scandinavia in 
the early 1990s, Japan in the 1990s, much of East Asia in 1997198; 
much the same syndrome may await India and China when they 
eventually liberalise. This experience, though general, was not. 
however, universal. Several major European countries, notably 
Germany, avoided any such experience. In the German case this may 
be attributed to their banking system being re-established, after 
World War 11, on a relatively liberalised basis from the outset. Even 
so, the dangers of enhanced financial instability in the immediate 
aftermath of liberalisation indicate the need for ensuring that 
financial supervision and risk management skills are improved a t  the 
same time. 
Liberalisation of banking sysf.ems has been one of the most potent 
progenitor of boom-bust cycles. but it has not been the only factor. 
Once the large companies, to whom the banks had primarily lent in 
the EichengreenIBordo third period (1945-711, had migrated to 
capital markets, banks increasingly began to lend t.o small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) and to persons. Such smaller size 
borrowers were, in general, somewhat riskier, and the costs of 
acquiring Information on a large number of idiosyncratic small 
borrowers were greater. So, banks placed increasing weight on 
collateral a s  a basis for lending. But this gave rise to the likelihood of 
enhanced dynamic instability, in the guise of the financial accelerator 
mechanism. see for cxalnple Bernanke, Gertler. and Gilchrist.(l999) 
and Clarida, Gall, and Gertler (1999). or the cyclical mechanism of 
Kiyotaki and Moore ( 1997). 
Essentially an upturn may be trimerecl by some good shock, e.g. to 
productivity or trade; profits incrcnse, assct valucs rise; lending 
increases because collateral becomes more easily available; enhanced 
lending raises investment, profits arid assct values. This goes on until 
the rise in the capilal stock becoines so largc that profit margins 
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crumble. Then. of course. everything goes into reverse. An interesting 
feature of such booms is that they are often characterised by stable 
real unit labour costs. (held down by productivity gains), stable prices 
(often held down by currency appreciation, partly owing to capital 
inflows), and seemingly prudent, or even robust, fiscal policies (with 
rising tax revenues and declining social expenditures); a markedly 
different profile from the earlier period. 
Besides greater lending to SMEs, banks also increasingly muscled 
in to the business of mortgage lending to households, territory which 
had previously been confined to specialised (and often cartelized) 
mortgage lenders. Again a similar nexus between some favourable 
initial shock leading to higher housing prices, providing a stronger 
collateral basis for bank lending, with such lending tending to cause 
yet higher housing prices, and so on, could be discerned on 
numerous occasions in a variety of countries, though more so in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, where home ownership is prized, rather than 
in Continental Europe. especially where accommodation is more 
commonly rented. 
Such characteristics have. of course. led to the debate on whether 
the monetary authorities could, and should, observe and then react to 
deviations of asset prices from some longer-term fundamental value, 
i.e. asset price bubbles: see in particular the debate between 
Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999); also see 
Gertler et al. (1998). This debate continues in the aftermath of the 
dot-com equity bubble and bust, but it is not the remit, or purpose. 
of this paper to discuss macro-monetary policies. Rather it is our 
objective to discuss how policies with respect to financial regulation 
and supervision inter-act with the cycle. 
B. Interaction between Regulation and the Trade Cycle 
These changing characteristics of the trade cycle, notably liberalised 
financial markets combined with sharp asset price fluctuations, have 
resulted in a crop of banking crises, and twin bankinglcurrency 
crises. Looking again a t  Table 1, the frequency of such crises reverted 
to the previous norm in 1880-1913, though still below that exhibited 
during the Great Depression in the inter-war years. 
The liberalisation of financial markets was meant to, and did, 
enhance competition. Competition led to lower profit margins. A 
combination of factors led to the assumption of greater risk in 
loan-books, e.g. the migration of larger (and safer) borrowers to 
capital markets. initial (i.e. post-liberalisation) inexperience with risk 
management, the desire to break into new and unfamiliar markets, 
and a wish to maintain the return on equity (ROE) despite declining 
margins for safer business. Riskier business led to a rise in 
non-performing-loans (NPLs) and subsequent write-offs. Declining 
profit margins and higher NPLs, plus a desire to maintain ROES, led 
to a trend decline in capital ratios. The decline in capital ratios 
implied worsening financial fragility. 
As this was happening, in the 1970s, the institutions with 
particular responsibility for maintaining the systemic strength of the 
banking system were the Central Banks in the major developed 
countries. They had not, in pract.ice, had much experience of such a 
role since the niiddle of the 1930s, but earlier historical developments 
had left them with that responsibility. As banking crises began to 
occur in the early 1970s, e.g. Franklin National (1 973), Herstatt 
(1973/74), Fringe Bank Crisis (1973/74), many of t.he key Central 
Bankers became nervous. 
Moreover, the growing development of international financial 
markets, the huge growth of international capital flows (following the 
removal of exchange controls), and the interpenetration of national 
financial markets a t  the wholesale level (and occasionally a t  the retail 
level also) by banks and investment houses with an  international 
reach, meant that no single country. even the U.S.A., could maintain 
higher standards of financial probity unilaterally. The problem was 
that, absent exchange controls. financial intermediation could just 
move off-shore. 
This led to onc of the [nore remarkable institut.iona1 developments 
of our age, the Base1 Corni~ilttee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 
(initially called the Blunden and then t.he Cookc Committee, with 
these being the officials from tlie Bank of England who were its first 
two Chairmen). This Coniniittce was established by thc conclave of 
the Central Bank Governors of the G10 meeting under thc auspices of 
the Bank for Intcrnat.iona1 Settlc~nents. It had no formal or legal 
status, no goverrirnental support (either international or national). Its 
pronouncenlents (Accords) werc the softest of soft law. Yet there were 
sanctions to encourage adhcrencc. The Central Batiks of the 
countries with the main international financial markcts were the 
leading members of Ulc BCBS. If a country rcf~lscd to abide by the 
Accords of the BCBS, the banks of t.hat country could have their 
BANK REGULATION AND MACROECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS 11 
branches, and/or subsidiaries, banned from operating in the main 
financial centres. 
As multi-national trade flourished and inter-national capital flows 
multiplied, so the leading banks and investment houses set u p  
subsidiaries and branches in many countries. There was an  urgent 
need to systematise and rationalise international procedures for 
banking supervision and, above all. to ensure that there was one lead 
regulator who could oversee the consolidated accounts of the bank as 
a whole, (a need evidenced for example by the Banco Ambrosiano 
collapse in 1981). The BCBS did much excellent work on this front. 
But their main concern was to halt and. indeed. to reverse the trend 
decline in capital ratios. 
They achieved that objective with the introduction of the Accord on 
Capital Adequacy Requirements (CARS) in 1988. now generally known 
as Basel I. This was a great success for the BCBS, which by now 
really deserves a proper full-scale historical assessment (not attempt- 
ed here). While Basel I was deservedly hailed a s  a great achievement, 
nevertheless it had a number of weaknesses. It is upon these that we 
shall now mainly focus. 
First, the decision was made to try to relate banks' capital 
requirements to the relative riskiness of the assets. That is a n  
understandable, some might say even an obvious. decision. But the 
measurement of risk is horribly complex. (finance academics spend a 
life-time on the subject). If the authorities try to lay down risk ratings, 
they run into a nasty dilemma. On the one hand, they can try to keep 
their risk measures simple and broad-brush, a s  in Basel I; but that 
will mean that such risk measurements will be inaccurate, and hence 
subject to gaming, arbitrage and avoidance, with unfortunate 
side-effects, as indeed happened with Basel I. On the other hand, 
they can try to make their risk-measurements a s  close to state-of- 
the-art analysis a s  possible. Since risk measurement is complex, the 
resulting requirements will similarly become dense and difficult, the 
more so since analytical logic often has to compromise with national 
idiosyncrasies. Moreover the state-of-the-art is evolving over time - we 
would hope that it is improving - so that what may be correct today 
will become inaccurate tomorrow, and hence, perhaps, over time as 
subject to gaming, arbitrage and avoidance a s  simpler rules. 
Moreover, the more detailed the rules, the more that it will tend to 
require those subject to them, i.e. the banks, to respond in exactly 
the same way to common shocks. That will enhance herd-like 
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behaviour, one-way markets. that many observers already have seen 
a s  a danger. even before Base1 11. In response to this. the BCBS can 
rightly state that the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) component of Basel 
11 has been an  instrument. to induce the banks to improve their own 
individual modelling of (credit) risk. On this view Basel I1 is but  a 
temporary phase (or step) in an evolving process whereby individual 
banks develop their own effective proprietary (credit) risk-metric 
models, preferably with continuing differences and innovation. Then, 
as has been happening with supervision of the tradinglinvestment 
book, the supervisors could focus on oversight of bank models, and 
not to try to specify such models themselves. One continuing concern, 
however, is that the modelling needs of bankers differs from those of 
supervisors. Supervisors are mostly focussed on what would happen 
under extreme adverse events, in the far one-sided tails of probability 
distributions, whereas bankcrs need to be concerned about the full 
distribution of outcomes. Whereas Value a t  Risk WaR) models do a 
good job most of the time, with their assumption of log normal 
distributions, and so are suitable for bankers, extreme events occur 
more often illan in a normal distribution. (fat tails, kurtosis), and so 
the bankers' inodel was not, as it happened, of much use to 
supervisors. 
The second wcakness is that I.hc supervision. the analysis, and the 
modelling, focusses primarily on the individual banking Institution. 
not on the system as  a whole. 'l'hcse two weaknesses are inter-related 
in the sense that the realisation that supervisors could not rely on 
bankers own VaR models led to a new generation of stress tests, or 
scenario simulations, in which individual banks were askcd to assess 
the effect on their own profitability, and capital adequacy, of the onset 
of certain extreme shocks. But lhcrc was no possibi1it.y whatsoever, in 
this attempt to estimate the cffect of a macro-shock on each individ- 
ual micro institution, of examining dynamic interactions between 
banks (e.g. if bank A was forced to withdraw funds from the 
interbank market. what effect would this have on bank B) or between 
bank reactions and the wider economy. (e.g. if banks would cut back 
on making new loans in the face of an adverse economic shock, 
would It impart a serious further downwards impulse on the 
economy?). In short the macro/micro stress tests go only part-way to 
a n  assessment (and measurement) of systemic fragility. 
Of course, the robustness of thc system as  a whole is related to the 
strength of the individual mcmbers. Given the myriad interconnec- 
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tions between banks, if the individual banks are in poor condition, 
then the banking system as  a whole is also likely to be fragile, and  
vice versa. Even so. it is perfectly possible to envisage circumstances 
where liquidity, or solvency, problems in one bank could have a 
cascade effect on other banks, perhaps via some combination of fund 
withdrawals and asset price declines. that could, possibly quite 
rapidly. bring initially healthy banks into serious difficulties. It is not 
possible to analyse and estimate such systemic weaknesses using 
present techniques. 
Some steps have been taken to analyse the systemic implications of 
one of the most obvious sources of inter-connection, i.e. the inter- 
bank market. Here there have been various empirical studies (e.g. 
Elsinger et al. 2002; Furfine 2003; Upper and Worms 2004; Wells 
2002), and the initial results have been quite reassuring. So long as 
pro rata payments on their inter-bank debts can be made quite 
quickly by failing banks, and/or concern about other banks' position 
with the failing bank does not trigger secondary (reputational) 
withdrawals of funds on them, then the first-round, direct effect of 
inter-bank linkages, via the interbank market, can almost always be 
comfortably absorbed. 
This analysis underlines one of the problems about trying to 
analyse financial fragility. Developments in the financial system 
depend critically on the state of confidence. Given that we are dealing 
with the aftermath of assumed extreme shocks, which by definition 
occur very rarely, it is almost impossible to give any quantification 
about the potential likelihood of such secondary (reputational) effects, 
(though one might be able, at  least in theory, to simulate them). 
Be that as it may, with two colleagues a t  the Bank of England, one 
of u s  is trying to model the systemic effects of extreme shocks, e.g. 
Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003). But that is somewhat 
separate from the main focus of this paper, and we will not pursue 
that further here. 
A common problem in this field is that regulations that are entirely 
sensible when applied to the individual institution can have 
unwanted, and often unintended, macro. aggregate effects. This is 
particularly so when the individual institutions are all simultaneously 
affected by a common factor, notably the trade cycle a s  we will 
discuss in the following sub-section. But whenever a common factor 
affects a large proportion of the intermediaries at  the same time, some 
unfortunate results may occur. 
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A good example of this occurred in the case of the U.K. Life 
Insurance companies in 2002. In this case the downturn in the equity 
market, following the dot-com bubble and bust. put pressure on the 
LI companies' solvency ratios, whereby they have to demonstrate that 
they can meet their obligations to stake-holders even should (equity) 
markets continue to decline. (by another 25%). The standard way to 
be sure of meeting such commitments is to match (hedge) the 
liabilities with assets of the same duration, and with a similar, fixed 
payment stream. So. the downturn in the equity market, interacting 
with the prudential requirements for solvency, forced the LI com- 
panies into selling equity onto a falling market, whilst buying 
long-dated (government) bonds on a rising market, thereby exacer- 
bating both market trends. Moreover, their predicament was obvious 
to others, who could attempt to benefit by front-running speculation. 
C.  The Procyclicality oJ Regulation 
The main common factor to affect banks, and most other financial 
intermediaries, is the trade cycle, i.e. generalised fluctuations in the 
economy. Regulation is inherently procyclical. Borrower and bank 
profits rise during booms; new capital is easier to raise; asset prices 
are higher. Per contra, in a downt.urn non-performing loans, failures 
and write-offs increase. Prudential regulations bite harder during 
periods of economic weakness because the individual banks are, 
indeed, more fragile. So, the more accurately the value, and relative 
riskiness, of each bank is measured at  any point of time, the greater 
will be the procyclicality of the prudential regime. Thus Basel I1 will 
be more procyclical than Base1 I ;  fair value accounting methods more 
than historic cost; point-in-time ratings more than those averaged 
through the cycle; and advanced internal risk based assessments 
more than foundation IRR, espccially so since Loss Given Default 
(LGD) is to be treated a s  constant over t.ime in the foundation 
method, whereas almost all empirical studies have found LCD to be 
strongly cyclical. perhaps a s  much, or more so. than the probability 
of default (PD), e.g. Acharya el al. (2003). Altman (2002), Altman et al. 
(2002). 
This proposition. that thc greater the accuracy of current valuation, 
the greater the resulting procyclicality of prudential regulation, is 
generally accepted. A much more problematic question is what the 
practical, empirical scale of this relationship may be, and how 
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important the resulting macro-economic consequentials may have 
been. We examine these issues in two studies in the empirical section 
of this paper. In section 111-B we reconsider whether, and how far, the 
requirement for additional capital. in order to satisfy the newly 
imposed CAR of Basel I ,  exacerbated the recession of 1991/92, 
especially in the U.S.A. where most of the empirical studies were 
carried out. The problem. a s  usual in such exercises, is to identify, 
and hence to separate. the relative effects of demand and supply on  
the flow of new bank loans. 
The second exercise. which we undertake in section 111-C, is to 
simulate the comparative effect of Basel 11, relative to Basel I, on 
CARS over the course of the cycle. For this purpose we use a data set  
from Mexico that was available to one of the authors (M. Segoviano). 
We also use data sets from Norway and the U.S.A., and comment on 
some other empirical exercises in the literature. 
This procyclicality of prudential regulation tends to exacerbate the 
trade cycle itself. We have already mentioned the example of the 
solvency regulations on Life Insurance companies enhancing the 
boom-bust experience on the London Stock Exchange. By the same 
token if banks, in aggregate, are subject to binding prudential 
constraints on their lending in downturns, (which constraints are 
relaxed during booms), the amplitude of the cycle is likely2 to be 
greater. 
Of course, if the scale of this problem of procyclicality is small. 
then we need not worry so much. But the empirical exercises in 
section 111-C, though a s  always inconclusive, suggest that the scale 
could be large. That raises the question of how best to respond. 
One approach is to use some kind of averaging of the data over the 
cycle, to use historic cost accounting, or constant PDs (as in Basel 1). 
or constant LGDs (as in the Foundation approach), or through-the- 
cycle ratings. But this goes against the grain of trying to obtain the 
best, and most accurate, valuations in order to guide efficient market 
pricing, investor information and capital allocation. 
A second possible response is to try to use fiscal, rather than 
2~ counter-argument is that, should the binding prudential regulations 
during downturns succeed in reducing the number and scale of bank 
failures, then the probability of systemic collapses during the recession will 
have been lessened. Likewise the greater sophistication of risk measurement 
methods may encourage private sector bank managers to curb their own 
risks in a voluntary manner. 
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monetary, measures to mitigate such pro-cyclicality. Capital gains 
taxes may limit the volatility of post-tax returns. In so  far a s  various 
taxes can be adjusted according to the condition of asset markets, 
they could be used by the authorities to mitigate pro-cyclicality. But 
this depends not only on the authorities having somehow better 
information on 'fundamental' asset prices, but may also introduce 
other distoruons which usually have adverse effects. 
A third, and perhaps more promising, approach is to adjust the 
prudential paramet,ers. (to be applied to the most accurately esti- 
mated valuations), contra-cyclically over the cycle (Gordy and Howells 
2004). This possibility, however, depends. quite largely, on their being 
an  identifiable cycle, which can be expected Lo revert back to some 
(estimated) normal. mean level. 
Assume. for example, that there is a recognised tendency for there 
to be mean-reversion towards some (calculable) PriceIEarnings ratio 
in the equity market. Then the solvency ratio calculations that are 
prescribed should require that the percentage fall that the LI should 
be able to withstand should be an increasing function of the current 
level of the PIE in the equity market. Similarly loan to valuation 
ratios in mortgage and property markets should. in principle, be 
functions of t.he deviation of housing/property prices from their 
equilibrium level. 
An obvious problem in this respect. both for the economy as  a 
whole and for the key asset markets, is that mean-reversion is an 
extremely weak and unreliable force, (think of foreign exchange 
markets) and that the ability to observe a long-run fundamental 
equilibrium is equivalently weak and doubtful. There is always a 
possibility t.hat. "there really is a New Economy." Although this latter 
is most often a (and in some cases a self-seeking) delusion, trends, 
e.g. in producuvity, do change. Estimates of output gaps, and of 
equilibrium assct prices. will always be extremely unreliable. Never- 
theless there is a case that it  would be better to tie prudential 
parameters to such unreliable estimates than to hold them constant 
over the cycle, which must have adverse effects on procyclicality. 
Thus it would be possible t.o require some contra-cyclical variation in 
minimum CAKs, raising these during booms and allowing these to fall 
back again during rccessions. 
Many might welcon~e this idea in principle, but argue that, since 
the estimatc of thc deviation frorn the norm is inevitably somewhat 
subjective. this should propcrly comc under Pillar 2 of Basel 11, a s  an 
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optional, discretionary add-on for national s u p e ~ s o r s ,  rather than as 
part of any agreed rule-book. And some supervisors may already be 
attempting to follow this course. There is some force in this 
argument, but it runs up against the problem that different national 
authorities will respond in different ways, so that international banks 
will vocally complain if their national authorities impose unilaterally 
higher CARs on them during expansions. Note also that minimum 
CARs will be required by formal regulation, e.g. EU directives, under 
Pillar 1, so that national supervision will not, (at least not officially), 
be allowed to combine higher ratios during expansions with ratios 
below the Pillar 1 requirement in recessions. So a draw-back of Basel 
II is that any national supervisor trying to build in some contra- 
cyclical effects into their own approach will simultaneously expose 
their own banks to higher over-time average CARs. There will be a 
clash between the desire for greater stability and the desire to allow 
their own banks to maintain international competitiveness. 
Nevertheless the main problem with this approach lies in the 
weakness of mean reversion and the difficulty of observing deviations 
from fundamentals. Once events have safely become past history, 
enabling the commentator to draw trend lines, historical cycles come 
to appear immediately obvious. If one. however, allows for changing 
trends, and other breaks in the time series, (and these have happened 
before now), then the estimates of current deviations (from "funda- 
mental" norms) become a matter of hot, and difficult, argument. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for Alan Greenspan not raising 
interest rates to constrain the dot-com bubble was that this would 
have been extremely difficult to justify to the U.S.A. Congress and the 
American people, the more so since there were many siren voices, and 
gullible investors, (see Brennan (2004)). who did not see the run-up in 
equity values as an unsustainable bubble. If it is too difficult for 
those in charge of monetary policy to assess deviations from 
fundamental equilibrium.3 why should financial regulators and 
supervisors be better endowed with economic insight? 
3~ counter-argument is that monetary policy makers already aim to 
assess deviations from long-run equilibrium in the guise of the output gap. 
so should they not be willing to assess similar deviations from equilibrium 
elsewhere in the economy, e.g. in the housing market. Against this it can 
be replied that the aggregate economy is generally more stable, and more 
predictable, than individual asset markets such as  housing, or equities, or 
foreign exchange. 
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A somewhat simpler alternative. to relating regulatory parameters 
to deviations from the norm, is to relate them to rates of change, 
relative to past average rates of change. These latter are easily 
calculated, (though the length of the window over which the average 
Is to be calculated is both somewhat arbitrary and can, a t  times, be 
substantively important). The rate of growth of bank lending to the 
private sector has, in the past, been a good predictor of financial 
crises, i.e. it is unusually high before crises. Again bubbles in asset 
prices tend to be characterised by accelerating prices a s  the peak. 
and resulting crisis/collapse is reached. If solvency requirements, 
loan to value requirements. etc.. were related to prior rates of change. 
i t  should help to avoid pro-cyclicality. 
All this discussion. however. is reminiscent of the long-past 
discussion on ways to stabilise the macro trade cycle via derivative or 
integral stabilisation, etc. Much of that, however, got washed away in 
the general attack on fine-tuning, and the belief that demand 
management is better focussed on long-term rules, such a s  achieving 
an  inflation target and sticking to a set of "golden" fiscal rules. 
By the same token one can ask whether it is the purpose of 
regulatory policy to concern itself with the amplitude of cyclical 
swings? Perhaps not, but then it is surely the purpose of regulatory 
policy to avoid systemic crises, rather than to prevent all individual 
failures. At present. the focus of financial regulation and supervision 
is on the individual institution, not on the system as  a whole. 
Through the indirect effects of procyclicality. it is at  least possible 
that the current, and prospective, methods of individual institutional 
supervision could have damaging implicatlons for the system as a 
whole. 
111. Empirical Analysis 
A. Financial Liberalisation. Credit Cycles, and the Changing Role 
of Asset Prices 
Since the mid 1970s there have been extensive efforts to liberalise 
banking systems in both developed and developing economies.4 The 
4For a chronology of financial Hberalisation in developed and developing 
markets see Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002). 
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trend towards financial liberalisation was motivated by theoretical and  
empirical findings that higher financial development leads to higher 
economic growth and that financial liberalisation was, in turn, a 
precondition for financial development. Theoretically, by easing finan- 
cial constraints and improving the efficiency of the banking system, 
banking sector liberalisation stirs higher and more efficient invest- 
ment in both physical and human capital and thus spurs faster 
long-run growth.5 Empirically, this hypothesis appears to be support- 
ed by the data (see e.g. Leahy et al. (2001)). 
In recent years, however, the perception of financial liberalisation 
has become more critical, owing to the recurrence of violent 
boom-bust cycles in credit creation, economic activity and asset 
markets in the wake of financial liberalisation. These boom-bust 
cycles often ended in outright systemic crisis of the banking sector. A 
central finding of the large and growing literature on the causes of 
banking crises is that financial liberalisation significantly increases 
the probability of a banking crisis. Various studies (Demirgiic-Kunt 
and Detragiache 1998: Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999) have shown 
that indicators of financial liberalisation help to explain the 
occurrence of banking crises in large samples of developing and 
developed countries. 
Rather surprisingly, only few studies have tried to derive stylised 
facts for the development of key macroeconomic and financial 
variables in the wake of financial liberalisation.6 Anecdotal evidence, 
e.g. Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) for the Nordic countries and 
Collyns and Senhadji (2002) for the East Asian countries, suggests 
that financial liberalisation is followed by boom-bust cycles in bank 
lending, economic activity and asset prices, especially real estate. In 
order to asses whether this finding also holds on a broader basis of 
'See Levine (1997) for a survey of the relationship between financial 
development and growth. 
"einhart and Tokatlidis (2001) derive stylised facts for the long-run 
effects of liberalisation for a large sample of developed and developing 
countries. They analyse the development of key macroeconomic variables. 
national account aggregates, monetary and credit aggregates and interest 
rates before and after dates of financial liberalisation in order to assess 
whether the pre and post-liberalisation mean of each indicator is signifi- 
cantly different. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) focus on the effects of 
financial liberalisation on the volatility of stock prices. They find that 
liberalisation leads to more pronounced boom-bust cycles in the short-run, 
but more stable stock markets in the long-run. 
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financial liberalisation episodes we looked at  the development of real 
GDP, bank lending, property prices and share prices in the wake of 
financial liberalisation for a sample of 16 OECD countries, Australia, 
Belgium. Denmark. Finland. France, Ireland, Italy, Japan. Korea, New 
Zealand. Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the 
U.S.A.7 
Figure 2 shows the unweighted country average (solid line) of the 
development of real GDP growth, the change in real bank lending, the 
change in real property prices and the change in real share prices 
(four-quarter growth rates) in the ten years followfng financial 
liberalisation together with upper and lower quartiles (dotted lines). 
The figures reveal that, on average, financial liberalisation is followed 
by a boom-bust cycle in economic activity, bank lending and asset 
prices. Real GDP growth starts to rise immediately after liberalisation 
and peaks after about three years. Then real growth gradually 
declines and falls below its initial value after about five years. Real 
lending growth starts to rise about five quarters after the date of 
liberalisation and peaks after about three years. Subsequently, the 
growth rate of real lending declines and falls below its initial value 
after about seven years. Property prices start to rise one year 
following liberalisation. The increase in property prices peaks after 
about three years and then gradually declines. After about six years, 
property prices start to fall. Real share prices appear to be rising at  a 
brlsk pace already at  the time of liberalisation. After liberalisation, the 
increase in share prices further accelerates and peaks after about six 
quarters. About five years after liberalisation, share prices are falling. 
Thus, the sample averages appear to support the notion that episodes 
of financial liberalisation are followed by pronounced boom-bust 
7Financial Hberalisation dates were identifled based on information 
provided in Abiad and Mody (2003). Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Click 
and Hutchison (1999). and Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998). The dates of 
liberallsation for the individual countries are 1985 for Australia, 1986 for 
Belgium, 1981 for Denmark, 1986 for Finland. 1985 for France, 1981 for 
Italy. 1985 for Japan. 1988 for Korea. 1985 for New Zealand. 1983 for 
Norway. 1981 for Spain, 1983 for Sweden. 1989 for Switzerland. 1981 for 
the U.K.. and 1982 for the U.S.A. Note that the date taken for the U.K. 
from this literature differs from that specifled earlier in section 11-A, which 
was 1971. This indicates both that liberalisatlon can proceed through 
several waves. (so there may be several valid dates for a single country), 
and that such dating inevitably Involves some, potentially fallible, subjective 
judgement. 
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cycles. 
The upper and lower quartiles, which are also displayed in Figure 
2, also reveal, however, that there is substantial variation in the 
movements of the variables across countries. A look at the individual 
country level data, which we do not discuss here for the sake of 
brevity.8 suggests that all countries experienced a cycle after financial 
liberalisation, but that there substantial variation in the timing of the 
1 , .  . , . . . , . . . , .  . . , .  . ,  . , .  . ,  8, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  , . . . . , . . . .  
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
Quarters anerl~berallsal~on Quarters anerl~beral~sat~on 
81ndividual country level data are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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occurrence of the cycle. This, may, however, partly be due to 
unavoidable imprecision in the exact dating of liberalisation episodes. 
Why do boom-bust cycles evolve in the wake of financial liberal- 
isation? Financial liberalisation relaxes the borrowing constraints 
faced by the private sector and therefore has similar effects to a 
positive, permanent productivity shock to the economy. In models 
with credit constrained borrowers.9 a positive productivity shock gives 
rise to a boom-bust cycle in lending, economic activity and asset 
prices. A positive productivity shock leads to an increase in the value 
of collateralisable assets. As the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs 
depends on the value of their collateralisable assets. this gives rise to 
higher lending, which in turn further fuels economic activity and 
asset prices, which again increases borrowing capacity, and so on. 
Eventually, all variables converge back to their steady state levels and 
the boom turns into a bust. Thc rcsult is a credit cycle a la KiyotaM 
and Moore (1997). Thus. from the perspective of models with credit 
constraints, the evolution of a boom-bust cycle in the wake of 
financial liberalisation is fully consistent with theoretical models with 
credit constraints and a financial accelerator. 
Financial liberalisation is in fact even likely to be associated with a 
strengthening of the financial accelerator mechanism and thus to give 
rise to more pronounced boom-bust cycles. As the liberalisation of 
banking systems has  usually been accompanied by liberalisations of 
capital and stock markets, it became easier for the largest and safest 
borrowers of banks to raise funds on the capital and stock market.10 
As a consequence, banks tried to make good the lost business by be 
beginning to lend to small and medium enterprises and persons. 
These smaller borrowers were, in general, somewhat riskier and the 
costs of monitoring these small borrowers were higher, so that banks 
placed increasing weight on collateral a s  a basis for lending. As a 
result, changes in t.he value of collateralisable assets, predominantly 
property, are likely to have a stronger impact on lending after 
liberalisation. 
In order to test. this hypot.hesis empirically, we performed rolling 
regressions for a rcducecl forrrl credit growth equation, where we 
 he basic references o f  this literature are Bernanlte and Gerller(1989) 
and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) .  
"See  Kaminsky and Schmukler(2003) for a cross-country chronology o f  
banking sector and stock rnarkct Iibcralisatlons. 
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regressed the change in real bank lending (Ac)  on its own lag, the 
lagged change in real property prices (Ap) ,  the lagged change in real 
GDP (Ay)  and the lagged change in the ex-post short-term real 
interest rate (Ar): 
Equation (1) was estimated by OLS for a sample of OECD countries 
over a rolling window of 15 years with quarterly data. In order to have 
a first coefficient estimate for a sample period covering mainly the 
pre-liberalisation period, availability of all explanatory variables back 
to the early 1970s was required. This data requirement reduced the 
sample of countries for this exercise to ten: Australia, France, Italy, 
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the 
U.S.A. The estimated rolling property price coefficients are displayed 
in Figure 3 in a 5% confidence band. The graphs appear to support 
the hypothesis of an increasing effect of property prices on bank 
lending. Except for Australia and New Zealand, there is for all 
countries a clear and significant increase in the rolling property price 
coefficient over the 1990s. A comparison of the first and the last 
rolling coefficient estimate makes a clear case. The first property price 
coefficient estimate of the rolling regression, which corresponds to the 
sample period covering the pre-liberalisation period from the early 
1970s to the mid 1980s. is insignificant in all countries. In stark 
contrast, the last property price coefficient estimate of the rolling 
regression, which corresponds to the sample period first quarter 1987 
to fourth quarter 2001, where domestic banking sectors in all 
countries under investigation were fully liberalised, is significant at 
least a t  the five percent level in seven out of ten countries. The rolling 
regression results therefore clearly support the view that bank lending 
has become more sensitive to property price movements in the wake 
of financial liberalisation. 
B. Macroeconomic Effects of the Basel Accord 
One of the responses to the increase in bank and thrift failures in 
the 1980s, especially in the U.S.A., and excessive risk taking by 
commercial banks in the wake of financial liberalisation, was the 
introduction of the Basel Capital Accord in 1988. " The Basel Accord 
requires international banks to "... hold capital equal to a t  least 







Australla New Zealand 
Note: The graphs report rolling OLS estimates of the property price 
coemcient in Equation ( 1 )  over a window of 15 years. 
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8% of a basket of assets measured in different ways according to 
their riskiness." (see Base1 Committee on Banking Supervision. 
1988). For example, low risk assets, like Treasury securities, have 
a 0 percent risk-weighted capital requirement, while high risk 
assets, like claims on commercial companies have ,a 100 percent 
risk weight. As a result, regulatory capital adequacy became more 
risk sensitive and the disincentives to hold liquid, low risk assets 
were reduced. 12 
Base1 Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) show that the 
introduction of the Basel Accord was followed by an significant 
increase in average risk weighted capital ratios in the G10 countries. 
Risk weighted capital ratios can increase by increasing regulatory 
capital (the numerator) or by reducing risk-weighted assets (the 
denominator). Figure 4 shows the development of regulatory capital, 
risk weighted assets and the CAR in the U.S.A. since 1990.13 The 
graphs reveal that the marked increase of CAR from 9.5% to above 
13% between 1990 and 1993 was brought about by both an increase 
in regulatory capital and a decrease in risk weighted assets. This, 
implies that the increase of CAR may have caused a reduction in the 
supply of credit to the economy, which is in the literature referred to 
as a 'credit crunch'. It is often argued that the adverse credit supply 
effects of the Basel Accord may have exacerbated the 1990/91 
recession. A convincing proof of this hypothesis is still missing, 
mainly due to the problem with identifying and separating credit 
demand and credit supply movements. 
Movements in real activity influence credit demand and movements 
in credit supply may influence real activity, which gives rise to a 
simultaneity problem, which has not yet been resolved convincingly. 
Figure 5 shows the development of real GDP growth and nominal 
lending groyth in the U.S.A. since 1965. The graph reveals that 
economic activity and credit creation are closely correlated over the 
I I Secretariat of the Base1 Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) states 
on p. 11 "the major impetus for the - 1988 Basel Capital Accord was the 
concern of the Governors of the G10 central 'banks that the capital of the 
world's major banks had become dangerously low after persistent erosion 
through competition." 
12 See Base1 Committee on Banking Supervision (1999). 
13 The data were taken from the BIS database. Unfortunately, there was 
no longer time series available for the U.S.A. For other countries, time 
series data for risk adjusted capital ratios and risk weighted assets, if at all 
available, do not go back further than the late 1990s. 
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cycles. which may be reasonably explained by the effect of economic 
activity on credit demand. The three recessions of 1974175. 1980182 
and 1990191 were all accompanied by slowdowns in credit creation. 
However, the 1990191 recession was the only case where credit 
growth turned negative. The downturn in bank lending was therefore 
stronger than would have been expected from prior experience. This is 
often taken a s  evidence that additional adverse supply effects were at 
work a t  that time. 
Various empirical studies have investigated this question by looking 
a t  the significance of credit supply determinants in credit growth 
regressions (see e.g.  Berger and Udell (1994)). An alternative strategy, 
followed e.g.  by Walsh and Wilcox(1995), is to take independent 
movements in the prime lending as an  indication of changes of credit 
supply conditions. The prime lending rate (which was never a market 
determined rate) used to be considered the rate a t  which banks lend 
to their best corporate customers. In practice, however, the best 
corporate customers borrow at  rates below prime and the prime 
lending rate is more a benchmark rate used to price loans for smaller 
firms and for less credit worthy large firms. In the long-run, lending 
rates are set a s  mark-up over the bank's marginal cost of funds, 
which is in the case of the prime rate given by the federal funds rate. 
The mark-up of lending rates over the bank's marginal cost of funds 
is a function of the additional costs a bank incurs when extending a 
loan, such a s  the cost of doing a credit evaluation and, in particular, 
the cost of raising the capital to meet the capital requirement for the 
loan. This implies that, given that capital requirements have been 
tightened by the Basel Accord. the spread of the prime rate over the 
federal funds rate would be expected to rise. which would be an 
indication of an  adverse supply effect on the credit market. Figure 6 
shows the development of the prime lending rate and the federal 
funds rate since 1980. The graph suggests that the spread of the 
prime rate over the federal funds rate has  in fact widened around 
1990/91. 
The hypothesis of a significantly widening spread of the prime rate 
over the federal funds rate can be tested more formally based on unit 
root tests. In an influential paper. Perron (1989) has shown that the 
presence of one time breaks in the trend or mean of a time series 
gives rise to non-rejection of the unit-root hypothesis in a standard 
unit-root test, such a s  the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test (Dickey and Fuller 1981). Perron has proposed a consistent 
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THE U.S.A. PRIME LENDING RATE AND THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE 
testing strategy against breaking trend and means, both for the case 
of known breakpoints (Perron 1989, 1990) and for the more general 
case of unknown breakpoints, where the dates of shifts In the mean 
or the trend are endogenously det.ermined in the testing procedure 
(Perron 1997). 
We start by testing the time series property of the spread of the 
prime rate over the federal funds rate based on standard ADF test 
over the period 1980-2003 based on monthly data taken from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics. The test. is based on the following 
regression: 
where x is the spread and 1 is deterministic time trend. The test of 
the null hypothesis of a unit-root is based on the t-statistlc of the 
coefficient y .  If y Is significantly different from zero, the null of a 
unit-root can be rejected. Since the distribution of the test statistic 
is non-standard under the null, the standard critical values do not 
apply. The 5% critical value tabulated in MacKlnnon (1991) is -2.87 
for the test regression with a constant but without a deterministic 
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TABLE 2 
UNIT ROOT TESTS FOR THE SPREAD O F  THE PRIME RATE 
OVER THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE 
ADF Test ADF Test Perron Test 
(innovational outlier (constant and trend) (constant and no trend) 
model) 
- 2.65 - 1.99 - 5.03 
Note: The 5% critical values are -3.43 for the ADF test with a constant 
and a trend. -2.87 for the ADF test with a constant but without 
trend and -4.80 for the Perron test for the innovational outlier 
model 
time trend and -3.43 for the case with a constant and determin- 
istic time trend in the test regression. The ADF test statistic for 
both cases is reported in Table 2. The lag order of the lagged 
dynamic terms was chosen based on sequential lag reduction tests 
starting with a maximum lag order of twelve, which suggested 
retaining the maximum number of twelve lags. In both cases the 
null of a unit root cannot be rejected. This finding would imply 
that there is no long-run relationship between the prime rate and 
the federal funds rate. An alternative interpretation, which would be 
suggested by Figure 6, is that there was a shift in the mean of the 
spread around the time of the introduction of the Basel Accord and 
that the non-rejection of the unit root hypothesis merely reflects 
the failure to take this shift into account in the testing procedure. 
In order to assess which interpretation is right, we apply Perron's 
(1997) unit root test with a break in the mean a t  an unknown date. 
The test is based on the test regression: 
where DUt = 1 (t > TI,) and D(TI,)( = 1 (t =Tb+ 1). Perron (1997) terms this 
model, where only a break in the mean is allowed for, the 
'innovational outlier modeY.14 The unit root test is performed based 
on the t-statistic for the null hypothesis y =  1. The lag order of the 
lagged dynamic terms was again chosen based on sequential lag 
reduction tests starting with a maximum lag order of twelve, which 
14 In the second model he proposes, the 'additive outlier model', both the 
mean and the trend are allowed to break. 
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suggested retaining ten lags. The break date was endogenously 
determined by calculating the unit root test statistic for all possible 
break dates and then choosing the date that minimises the unit 
root test statistic. The break date chosen by the testing algorithm 
i s  September 1990 and the final test regression is given by: 
with DUt= l ( t  > 1990:9) and D(T,)( = 1 (t= 1990: 10). The regression 
results suggest that the mean spread is significantly higher after 
September 1990. The unit root test statistic, which is reported in 
Table 2. is given by -5.03 which compares with a 5% critical 
value of -4.80. Thus, the Perron unit root test with unknown 
breakpoint suggests that the spread of the prime rate over the 
federal funds rate is stationary around a constant mean which 
breaks in September 1990 and that the mean spread appears to be 
higher after the break. These results give some indication of 
potentially lasting supply effects of the introduction of the Basel 
Accord on the U.S.A. credit market. 
C. Basel and Procyclicality 
Our procedure here is to try to reconstruct a typical bank portfolio 
for a country and then, holding the presumed loan book unchanged 
over Ume. (i.e. replacing failed loans with loans of a similar quality), 
to examine how the loan ratings would have shifted, and hence how 
the capital adequacy requirements for the banks would have varied 
over time; for other similar exercises see Kashyap and Stein (2004) 
and Gordy and Howells (2004). To do this we use Moody's data on 
U.S.A. corporate bonds, included on Moody's Investors Service, Credit 
RIsk Calculator. We can only do this exercise for those countries for 
which Moody's data on credit ratings has a long enougl~ time series. 
Unfortunately this rulcs out. most large Europcan countries since 
adequate Moody's data only goes back t.o 1988 for thc U.K..  2001 for 
Germany; 2002 for France; 2003 for Italy; 2002 for Spain. In the 
event we used data provided by the Mexican Financial Regulatory 
Agency and the Norwegian Central Bank on Corporate Loans. The 
Mexican data incorporates information between 1995 and 2000 and 
the Norwegian data incorporates information between 1988 and 200 1. 
This sounds easier than it actually is to do, and a detailed 
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exposition of this exercise has been done separately, Goodhart and 
Segoviano (2004). in a Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper. 
For an earlier exercise along these same lines, and using the same 
Mexican data set, see Segoviano and Lowe(2002). Amongst the 
problems are how to reconstruct a 'typical' bank portfolio; whether, 
and how, to deal with the problem of failing loans dropping out of the 
portfolio; and what account to take of the fact that Basel II is a 
regime change that may make banks alter their 'typical' behaviour. 
Very briefly, we reconstructed a typical bank portfolio as follows. We 
assumed that each portfolio consisted of 1000 loans, each one with 
equal exposure. From each specific country data sources, we obtained 
the through time proportion of assets (bonds for the U.S.A. or 
corporate loans for Mexico and Norway) that were classified under 
each of the reported ratings for a given country. With this information 
we constructed the benchmark portfolio that we used to compute 
capital requirements at each point in time. 
By assuming that the initial bank loan book remains unchanged 
throughout, this is equivalent to assuming that failed loans are 
replaced by loans of similar initial quality. This is what Kashyap and 
Stein (2004) did, and seems natural. Gordy and Howells (2004) argue, 
however, that banks will aim for a higher quality portfolio during 
recessions, and thus will replace failing loans with credits of higher, 
than initial, quality. At the macro level it is hard, in most countries, 
to see where the supply of such higher quality loans would come from 
during recessions; in discussion of this point a t  a BIS Conference in 
May 2004, Michael Gordy noted that in the U.S.A. high quality com- 
panies tended to shift their borrowing from capital markets, e.g. the 
commercial paper market, to banks during recessions. In any case, 
since risk spreads widen during recessions, any extra benefit would 
be slight. So we feel relatively comfortable about this assumption. 
The results of this exercise for the three countries examined are 
stark. We compared the implied capital requirements for our 'typical' 
bank under three regulatory regimes; first the standardised approach 
in Basel II,  (which is close to that applied in Basel I): second, the 
Foundations IRE3 approach, (i.e. assuming a constant Loss Given 
Default, since we have no good time series in any country for average 
LGD): and third, an Improved Credit Risk Method (ICRM). This latter 
uses a Merton approach to model credit quality changes and an 
indirect approach to model correlations amongst the individual credits 
in the overall portfolio. The construction of an ICRM is, however. 
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quite complex, and interested readers should consult our companion 
paper, Goodhart and Segoviano (2004). 
In a nutshell, this latter approach entails deriving the distribution 
of the possible values that the portfolio of financial assets held by the 
bank can take. The potential different values that a portfolio could 
take - and their respective probabilities - are recorded in the so-called 
profit and loss distribution of the portfolio (P&L). For risk manage- 
ment purposes, the Value at  Risk measure (VaR), from which eco- 
nomic capital for a bank is defined, is obtained from this distribution. 
If a bank holds a portfolio of assets, we can then attempt to quantify 
how the diversification of its assets will affect the value of its 
portfolio. So, when computing the P&L, the geographical location and 
industrial activity of the assets held in a portfolio are taken into 
account. When implementing this approach, we assumed that the 
benchmark portfolios had loans that were evenly distributed across 
geographical regions and industrial activities within their respective 
countries. We then programmed an algorithm that simulated 10,000 
different 'quality scenarios' that might affect these portfolios, and so 
produce a migration of loans between credit quality bands. Each 
quality scenario shows a change in the market value of the assets. 
and therefore the difference between the initial and final credit 
quality. Once the credit portfolio quality scenarios were simulated, we 
computed the losses/gains that come from the difference between 
initial and final credit qualities. The losses/gains obtained from the 
simulation process were used to build a histogram, which summarises 
the loss distribution of the credit portfolio. From this distribution a 
'value a t  risk' WaR) is defined from which we can obtain the amount 
of unexpected losses from the portfolio. The unexpected losses divided 
by the total amount of the portfolio represent the percentage that 
with, a given probability. (for example the 99.9 percentile) could be 
lost in an  extreme event. 
Anyhow, we have simulated the time paths of CARS under each of 
our three approaches, standardised. IRB Foundation (IRB F) and 
ICRM, for our various countries, and the results are set out in Tables 
3 to 5. and Figures 7 to 9. 
The important result to observe is the much greater variance of the 
simulated outcomes for the IRE? than for the standardised or ICRM 
approaches. During periods of strong growth, high profits and low 
NPLs, (U.S.A. in the mid 1990s and Norway in 1997), the IRB has  a 
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TABLE 3 
CARS FOR T H E  U.S.A. 
Period Standardised IRB F ICRM 
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TABLE 4 
CARS FOR Norway 
Period Standardlsed IRB F ICRM 
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TABLE 5 
CARS FOR MEXICO 
Period Standardised IRE3 F ICRM 























CARS FOR MEXICO 
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A. IRB Upwards Downwards ,. 
Pe:,od Dale Consccutlvr Dt11rs Pe:locl Da(e Consrcutlvr Dales 
Prrlotls -- Prrlocls -- -.. -- - - . - 
U.S.A. 0.25 IDHI) 0.33 1!)8I)/90 -0.29 1992 -0.49 1992/93 
Norway 0.39 I9514 0.45 II)M4/I)9 -0.27 1 7  -0.11 1996/97 
Mrxlco 0.25 I1c.r-Of; 0.30 Srl)/l)rr -0 21 Mi~r 97  -0.30 Milr/Jun 
9ti 97  
---- 
B. ICRM Upwards Downwards 
1 2 1 2 Perlot, Dirlc Consecullvr Di~lrs  Pcrlod Dale Consrcullvr Dales 
Ptsrlocls Pcrlocls - 
U.S.A. 0.21 1998 0.33 1998199 -0.28 1993 -0.47 1993/94 
Norway 0.13 1995 0.20 1994195 -0.25 1997 -0.37 1996/98 




1 2 1 2 prriotl Date Consec~~llve Di1tc.s Pcrlotl Dirlc <:onsrcullvc Dalcs 
Pcrlocls Pcr&~cls 
lower CAR than the standardised approach in all our developed 
countries; whcrcas in recessions, (e.g.  U.S.A. in 1990191, Mexico mid 
1995/96 and Norway in 1994/95), the CAR is markedly higher for the 
IRB than in the othcr two approaches. In Mexico, an emerging market 
economy (EME), the average quality of loan is lower throughout than 
in developed countries, so the IRB gives a higher CAR in all years, 
but, a s  in developed countries, the variancc of the CAR (up in 
recessions a s  in 1995/96, and lower during the better years) is 
greater for the IRB than in the other two approaches. 
It follows that the O h  change in the required CAR under the IRB as 
a country moves from boom to recession (up) and back to boom again 
(down) will be much more extreme under the IRB than under the 
other two approaches. This is shown in Table 6. 
The implication of this is that procyclicality may well still be a 
serious problem with Elasel 11, even after the smoothing of the risk 
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curves that were introduced between Consultative Papers 2 and 3 
produced by the Basel Committee to mitigate this problem. However 
there will be other potentially offsetting factors. Banks normally keep 
buffers above the required minimum CARs, both for their protection 
against sanctions should the minimum be infringed and to satisfy 
ratings agencies, and these buffers are likely to be raised during 
booms when IRE3 CARs may fall to extremely low levels. Note, 
however, that we have used Moody's data for the U.S.A. from 1982 to 
2003, for Norway from 1988 to 2001 and for Mexico from 1995 to 
2000, which are already supposed to be averaged over the cycle, 
whereas most commercial banks are, so we are told by several of 
them, likely to use point-in-time ratings, which could worsen 
pro-cyclicality yet further. 
IV. Conclusion 
Basel II will be a regime change, and one of the purposes of this is 
to make bankers more conscious of risk assessment and risk 
management. It has already succeeded in this. One hope is that it will 
induce bankers to be more prudent during booms despite declines in 
CARs. An implication of a move from the standardised to an  IRB 
approach is that the individual bank making this transition will be 
encouraged to shift its portfolio to higher-quality, higher rated credits, 
because it then benefits from a lower CAR. This is good of itself, but 
the higher the quality the credit, the steeper is the risk curve, 
(relating quality to required risk ratio); so the procyclicality is likely to 
be enhanced, even if average quality improves. 
When a regime change is introduced, no one in truth can predict 
its ramifications, certainly not us. Nevertheless these simulations 
suggest that procyclicality could remain a serious concern. It is even 
possible that, with the advent of a serious downturn, if one was to 
occur, the impact of abiding by the IRB would be too severe for the 
authorities in some countries to countenance. Perhaps like the 
Stability and Growth Pact it would only be observed in the breach 
when it began to bite hard. Possibly an even greater worry might be 
that the adoption of Basel II,  while not being so adverse a s  to force 
reconsideration, might yet exacerbate future capital fluctuations. 
Certainly there remains a tension between relating CARS more 
closely to underlying risks in individual banks, and in trying for 
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macro-economic purposes to encourage contra-cyclical variations in 
bank lending in aggregate. How to square this circle must, however. 
be a subject for future research. 
(Received 4 May 2005: Revised 28 October 2005) 
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